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ABSTRACT
This report develops a modern naval combat model. It deals
with naval surface missile combat and models the attrition as
a force-on-force process described in discrete time steps, or
"salvos." The degradation of each force is expressed in terms
of remaining staying power and combat power in both opponents.
It is based on LT. Beall's model, but since it deals with
missile warfare it incorporates the defensive ability of each
force. Furthermore, as a central feature, the model
incorporates several human factors that affect the outcome of
a naval battle: specifically scouting and alertness
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As war becomes more complex, the importance of combat
models becomes increasingly relevant. But what is a model and
what are its features?
A mathematical model is a mathematical construct which is
designed to study a particular real-world system or
phenomenon. A model can be a formula, equation, or system of
equations describing how the underlying factors are
interrelated [Ref. l:p. 32]. In other words, "a model is a
simplified representation of the entity it imitates or
simulates." [Ref. 2:p. 1]
What is the general purpose of a combat model? There are
two main purposes. First, a combat model can be considered as
a tactical and decision-aid tool to help the decision maker.
This is well summarized in the statement,
A model is useful if a better decision can be made with
the information that it adds. [Ref. 2:p. 17]
Experience from historical naval combat leads to the
conclusion that a reliable and credible model can decisively
help a commander make more sophisticated decisions in the
combat arena. A rapid and intelligent decision can change
drastically the outcome of a naval combat. It is not claimed,
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however, that theory alone can win a battle. Leadership,
morale, well-trained personnel, a vital and wise doctrine, and
technological developments are chief among the factors that
also count in determining the outcome. It is claimed that a
good model greatly helps a leader make quicker, and usually
wiser, decisions. As Burke' pointed out, the difference
between a good leader and a bad one is about ten seconds [Ref.
3:p. 190].
The second purpose of a validated combat model is to aid
in studying historical battles. Humans can learn from the
mistakes of their predecessors, taking advantage of useful and
valuable lessons. Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Army Ret., has
stated:
History provides a base from which the anticipated effect
of the new technology can be judged [Ref. 4:p. xxi].
Further:
The value of military history is that, when analyzed
objectively and scientifically, it permits us to project
forward the trends of real past experience. This is the
only way the relevant lessons of actual combat can be
brought to bear on the important national defense issues
of today. [Ref. 4:p. xxvi]
Using a model to analyze historical battles, analysts are
able to answer some important questions. Among these are:
0 In a particular situation, did the commander make the
right decision?
'Arleigh Burke, a famous tactician, who defeated the Japanese at the battle of Cape
St. George on November 25, 1943.
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* If he had used the model, would he have persisted in his
decisions or would he have changed his tactical plans?
An important factor of every combat model is the measure
of effectiveness (MOE). What is chosen ultimately to measure?
How do we assess or predict the outcome of an engagement? Do
we consider attrition on both sides, probability of winning,
accomplishment of the mission, or combat power for each side?
Two other MOE options are: the total percentage loss of each
force after the engagement, and the expected time until a
certain percent of the enemy's combat power is destroyed. MOEs
depend also on the level of command. That is, for the same
mission, the chief of headquarters, the force commander, and
the captain of a unit may be interested in measuring different
outcomes. Therefore, who will use the information, and to what
purpose, must be considered in deciding what the model output
will be.
B. HUMAN FACTORS RELATED TO NAVAL COMBAT MODELS
Most of today's combat models do not take into account
human performance under the specified conditions of the model.
In existing models, the representation of people--the real
combatants--is assumed to be deterministic. However, as
experience has taught, human performance and action greatly
influence the outcome of an engagement in many ways and they
generally do not vary in a deterministic manner. Combat models
3
will reflect real-world conditions only if actual data about
human performance is included.
The difficulty of incorporating human performance data in
combat models stems from the intangibility of the human
variables that are involved. That is, the human variables are
very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify with any degree
of confidence because they are essentially qualitative in
nature (Ref. 5:p. 34].
Recognizing that numerous human factors issues affect
naval combat either directly or indirectly, T.N. Dupuy, in
association with colleagues from the Historical Evaluation and
Research Organization, has developed a methodology to include
several human-related variables. Called the Quantified
Judgment Model, or simply QJM, Dupuy's method introduces a
factor Q, for troop quality. This factor includes the human
factors of leadership, morale, and training, as well as
logistical capability, intelligence, initiative, command and
control, communications, momentum, time, and space (Ref. 4:p.
106]. Because this Q factor is not directly measurable, Dupuy
uses the term "combat effectiveness" in place of troop
quality. In his usage combat effectiveness reconciles the
difference between results based on theoretical combat power
and actual battle results. In the narrow frame of this thesis
we will consider, and briefly describe, only the three major
4
human factors included in Dupuy's QJM: leadership, morale, and
training.
1. Leadership
In his book Fleet Tactics [Ref. 3), Capt. Wayne P.
Hughes, Jr., emphasizes the importance of a good leader in a
naval battle. If leadership is an important human factor in
land combat, then, because of the peculiarity of a warship, it
is of essence in naval warfare. On board a ship there is no
alternative: everybody goes where the leader goes and
everybody shares with the leader a common fate. Capt. Hughes
talks about the "mystique" or "charisma" of leadership [Ref.
3:p. 26]. Further, he states:
...Shall we say, Know your forces, know your enemy and
know yourself? This is all splendid advice, but I would
argue that nothing takes precedence over the peacetime
commander's job of finding combat leaders. Let him do his
best to find them, send them to sea, and keep them at sea
longer than the U.S. Navy does now. Let the first aim of
every seagoing commander be to find two officers better
than himself and help in every way to prepare them for
war. That done, everything else will follow. [Ref. 3:p.
195]
We would add here that what is likely to follow is better
command and control, more effective scouting, and
concentration of power. Hughes' maxim, "Attack effectively
first," will then be applied, and potential destructive
losses can be converted into glorious victories.
It should be noted that it would be a fatal mistake of a
commander in preparing his tactical plans to overestimate his
capabilities and underestimate the abilities of the leader of
5
his opponent force. Before the battle a commander should
consider the leader of the enemy to be at least as good as
himself.
2. Morale
Morale may depend heavily on having a good leader. We
believe also that morale and training go together. It seems
reasonable to assume that, with well-trained personnel under
a good leader, it would be unlikely to see panic in a
difficult situation. We also believe that one factor that
plays an important part in personnel morale is a certain
"quality of character" that depends neither on the education
nor on the training of the personnel. One word to describe
that quality is "ethos."
According to Peter Watson, other factors affecting
morale can be summarized as follows:
* The results of the first encounter. If the first battle
has been fought and won, this successful encounter will
help morale rise.
* The emotional support provided by informal leaders (those
who "take charge," whether or not they have formal
authority).
* The number of casualties incurred. Reducing physical
casualties helps greatly in maintaining high morale.
* The cohesiveness of the grouDs. Morale is much higher if
personnel are trained in small groups and kept together
all the time. These "teams" have better esprit de corps.
[Ref. 6:pp. 231-232]
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Is it possible to quantify morale? As with all
intangible factors, this question cannot be answered with
certainty. However, Dupuy proposes a set of numerical values
for various levels of morale. These are shown in Table I below
[Ref. 5:p. 231).
TABLE I. DUPUY'S QUANTIFICATION OF MORALE LEVELS






3. Training and Experience
If a substantial difference exists in the level of
training and experience between the two opposing sides, the
outcome of the battle may be influenced greatly. For this
reason it is essential that during peacetime everyone involved
be as professionally trained in his domain as possible. Aboard
a warship everyone acting individually, as well as in a group,
during combat should know exactly what to do and when to do
it.
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History indicates that chance or luck sometimes greatly
influences the outcome of naval combat. Sometimes a good
leader seems "lucky" when he exploits all his opportunities
perfectly. Yet, what may be considered pure chance by an
inexperienced analyst may actually be a mixture of experience
and boldness. On the other hand, luck always helps even bold
and brave people. Though boldness and bravery are important,
it would be a mistake to disregard the influence of chance or
luck. It should be noted here that, in some countries, one
quality used to grade Naval officers is how lucky they appear
to be.
C. THESIS GOAL AND SCOPE
The goal of this thesis is to develop a reasonable modern
naval combat model which, after it has been appropriately
validated, could be used for two primary purposes. These are:
0 For better understanding of historical naval battles.
* As a tactical or decision aid "tool" that a commander may
use to assess his tactical plans.
For the latter purpose, it is assumed that the tactical
commander uses the model for a reasonable length of time, and
that he is able to estimate the composition and state of the
enemy force (using scouting efficiently). Moreover, it is
assumed he knows the exact situation (state) of the combat
force assigned to him.
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In order to develop a model, information is presented as
follows. In Chapter II an extensive naval combat theory is
described and appropriate terminology introduced. This is
intended to help the reader better understand the concepts
that follow.
In Chapter III two different model approaches are
described. The reason for this is to introduce the reader to
the world of combat models, and to give a sense of how such
models work and their weak and strong points. The first of the
two models to be presented is Dupuy's Quantified Judgment
Model (QJM), incorporating modifications proposed by Capt.
Joseph Ciano, U.S. Marine Corps [Ref. 7]. A brief description
and explanation of the model are provided, including a
presentation of its main equations. The weaknesses of the
model are also discussed.
The second modeling approach is based on Capt. Hughes'
concepts about naval warfare. This approach was developed by
Lt. Thomas Reagan Beall, U.S. Navy [Ref. 8]. The model is
described briefly, including how it functions and its
weaknesses. The two modeling approaches are then compared.
Chapter IV is devoted to the development of a modern naval
combat model that includes various human-related factors.
This combat model is based on Hughes' model (as developed in
Beall's thesis [Ref. 8]). We also attempt to correct some of
the weaknesses of the Dupuy and Beall models. First, the
9
problem is identified and the assumptions are stated. An
indirect method of quantifying the intangible human factors of
leadership, morale, and training follows in order to integrate
them into the model.
Only pulse weapons (specifically missiles) are considered
in developing the model. Pulse weapons are considered those
weapons which deliver instantaneously an enormous amount of
combat power against a target. Missiles, torpedoes, and bombs
are examples of pulse weapons [Ref. 8:p. 6]. This limitation
is based on the belief that today's naval warfare can be
considered salvo warfare; that is, combat based on modern
naval surface missiles. The immense technological development
since World War II drives us to believe that the idea of
gradual attrition of one force by the other is obsolete. Also
included in Chapter IV are several numerical examples, in an
attempt to shed light on how the developed model works.
Conclusions concerning the credibility of the model are
summarized in Chapter V. Recommendations for further research
and validation of the model are also included there.
Appendix A contains computer code (Fortran 77)
illustrating how the model developed in Chapter IV works under
specific assumptions. Also included there are the computer
outputs of the examples used in Chapter IV.
10
II. NAVAL COMBAT THEORY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is devoted to a general discussion of combat
theory and terminology in order to help the reader understand
the models that are addressed in the next several chapters.
Discussion is limited to the most basic ideas necessary for
familiarity with naval combat and for understanding a naval
combat model. The goal of this chapter is to lay the
foundation for the developments to follow and to establish a
framework of terminology.
The basic concepts analyzed in this chapter are drawn from
J.T. Swanson and J.H. Gibson (Reference 9, pages 8 to 29), and
Capt. Hughes (Reference 3, and Reference 10, pages 2 to 16).
Hughes' extensive knowledge of the subject guarantees that the
concepts and ideas developed below are the product of many
years experience.
B. COMBAT THEORY
1. Command and Control
The importance of leadership has already been
discussed, but what are the duties and qualities of a leader?
They are known to be associated with the phenomena of command
and control, but what is meant by "command and control?"
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If each term is examined separately, command and
control both represent military functions. Command is the
function that organizes, motivates, and decides what is needed
from forces. Control executes the command decisions. In other
words, control is the function that transforms the perceived
need into action (Ref. 3:p. 147].
Command and control (C2) is a process involving a
person who is responsible for making decisions and causing
those decisions to be executed. These two ideas, decision
making and execution of the decisions, are the key elements of
the command and control process.
From a military point of view the decisions made by a
commander concern military organizations and operations. The
main purpose of a military organization's existence is to
carry out activities related to armed conflicts. Thus, every
decision concerning military organizations should be based on
one key concept: enhance the fighting ability of the military
organization in combat. The essence of a command and control
system is to analyze, evaluate, and find ultimately what
action should be carried out to direct the organization in
accomplishing its mission. Communication is included in the
command and control process. Thus it is not necessary to
define command, control, and communication (C3) as a separate
concept here.
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2. Combat and Forces
Military organizations are made up of forces.
Personnel and equipment are components of a force. We need to
distinguish the idea of a military force as personnel and
equipment from the concept of force in its physical sense of
"compulsion exerted in a battle." We define force as the
warships and aircraft that create the compulsion exerted on
the battlefield. We will call this compulsion "combat power."
Combat is then defined as an interaction of force-on-force
activities. The tools used to carry out the battlefield
activities are the military forces.
An element of a force is a unit (a ship, for example)
of which the force is composed. An element is characterized by
specific features, such as the number of personnel, type of
weapons, ammunition availability, its geographic location, and
so forth. In naval operations, an element is typically a ship.
Several elements of force, taken together with a common task,
constitute a grouR. For instance, the common task could be
delivering firepower to the enemy, or disrupting the combat
functions of the enemy. How are the various terms that are
defined above related to one another? The following statement
gives some insight.
In combat each element of a force will perform actions
based on the function assigned to the element (by
command), the current state of the element (capability of
the element at a given time) and the attributes of the
element. For example, an AAW unit will perform actions
against enemy aircraft, but it is not expected to take
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effective action against enemy infantry or armor. [Ref.
9:p. 12]
Combat activity is defined as the change in the state
of both sides caused by an element-action-element exchange.
The collection of these activities causes a change in the
total force of both sides.
3. Combat Potential
The combat potential of an element (ship) or force is
represented by the weapons and ammunition it carries. Combat
potential includes the ammunition stored in the magazines as
well as ammunition loaded in guns, launchers, and so forth. It
can be considered as the overall capacity of a particular
force to carry out combat activities successfully against an
enemy.
The combat potential characterizes the current state
of a given force and is categorized into two types: designed
combat potential and available combat potential. The designed
combat potential is the (designed) capacity of a given force
to achieve its full potential given a known enemy and given
that all the other factors affecting the combat are optimal
(optimal scouting, optimal leadership and training, and
optimal functioning of equipment). This combat potential can
be considered as a theoretical entity in the sense that it
represents the best a given force can do (all other factors
considered as optimal).
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The available combat potential of a force (for a
specified combat mission) is its current or actual capacity to
achieve successful results, given existing levels of scouting,
leadership, and training. Clearly the available combat
potential of a given force in a given battle is less than its
designed combat potential (usually some fraction between 0.0
and 1.0 of the designed combat potential) [Ref. 9:p. 14).
4. Combat Power
A very important aspect of combat power is that it is
specified only for a certain mission in a particular
environment against a particular enemy. This characteristic is
due to the fact that combat power is a real phenomenon in a
battle: it is the actual capability of the force to achieve
results in a combat. When the forces are activated by a
commander in the command and control process, combat power is
produced. Combat Rower is considered to be the rate of force
projection, that is, shells, torpedoes, bombs, or missiles
fired against an enemy by the forces within a command. The
following few sentences describe in an effective and concise
way the concept of combat power and its relationship to the
command and control process, force, and combat potential.
Combat power is generated against an enemy as a result of
forces carrying out combat actions against the enemy based
upon a commander's activation of his forces, utilizing a
command and control process. The combat power is generated
from available combat potential of the forces involved,
but does not necessarily consume the potential of the
forces in the way that energy is consumed from a battery
during its use. [Ref. 9:p. 14]
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Combat power can thus be seen as a function of the
number of a force's elements on the one hand, and the type of
forces and rate of their activities on the other. If P denotes
combat power, m the number of elements in a force, and u the
rate of the force's activities, then the fundamental equation
of combat power is given by
P = F(mu)
where F is called the command function. [Ref. 9:p. 15]
Another important differentiation in combat power is
the distinction between theoretical and effective combat
power. Theoretical combat power can be considered roughly as
the quantity of ammunition the specific unit (platform) can
fire per time unit or per salvo (for pulse weapons). On the
other hand, effective combat Dower or simply combat
effectiveness is the combat power that results in attrition to
the enemy. It can be represented as the number of hits per
time unit2 .
5. Combat Effectiveness
Combat effectiveness can be thought of as the
attrition of the enemy caused by delivered combat power.
Combat effectiveness is measured by combat results during a
'According to the theory, other effects are sometimes important. For example,
suppression of enemy fire and movement, or interdiction of reinforcements and
supplies. These effects will not be treated in this thesis.
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battle, and combat outcome is the cumulative attrition of the
3enemy achieved by combat power
Another distinction is now apparent. The results of
combat functions performed by Side A (that is, the effect of
combat power exerted by it) depend on Side B's defensive
actions. Side B is applying countermeasures (such as jamming,
evasion, and so forth) to lessen the effectiveness of Side A's
combat power. Side B is likewise applying offensive activities
that generate its combat power against Side A while side A
attempts to attenuate these activities.
Thus both sides simultaneously apply offensive
activities, thereby creating combat power against the
opponent, as well as defensive activities to lessen the effect
of the opponent's combat power. It is now clear why combat is
defined as an interaction of force-on-force activities.
The above definitions and interpretations are
summarized in the following paragraph.
...command is the all encompassing function which
generates the designed and available combat potential.
Through the subfunctions of organizing, motivating,
deciding and executing, a commander brings his forces from
some untrained or otherwise unready condition to a point
where the available combat potential of the forces is as
near as possible to its designed combat potential. The
readiness of the forces prior to executing an operation is
the responsibility of commanders at many echelons and is
accomplished through the function of command. [Ref. 9:p.
18]
'The theory does not require that results be measured as attrition, but that there
is some suitable measure for naval combat.
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6. Scouting and Antiscouting
Scouting and antiscouting have played an important
role in naval history, from earliest times through the
present. These processes can definitely decide the outcome of
naval combat and sometimes give the victory to the "inferior"
side. Scouting is the gathering of useful combat information.
Using this definition, acts of search, detection, tracking,
targeting, surveillance, reconnaissance, and cryptanalysis are
considered as scouting [Ref. 3:p. 146]. Scouting is achieved
only when the information is actually delivered to the
tactical commander for considered action.
Antiscoutin includes all actions taken to lessen,
destroy, or diminish the enemy's scouting effectiveness. To
shoot down a reconnaissance aircraft, jam its radar, or use
any other means to reduce the ability of an enemy to gather
information is considered antiscouting.
7. Other Important Definitions
Command and control countermeasures (C2CM) are actions
carried out by Side A to reduce the effectiveness of Side B's
command and control process. The result of such
countermeasures can be that Side B cannot effectively activate
its forces, thereby decreasing its combat power. For example,
in the effort of Side B to establish communications between
its units (C2 process), Side A answers by jamming the
18
frequencies used by B, therefore trying to prevent Side B from
effectively activating its forces.
Generally each combat process on one side has a
countermeasure on the other side. The combat processes,
together with their countermeasures. are summarized in Table
II. [Ref. 10:p. 3]








Supply (or support) Interdiction
Maneuver (or motion) Fixing (including
disruption)
Command and control Counter-C2 (including
(including deception)
communication)
'In naval terminology, escorts forming a screen perform both the screening and
protection processes.
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Firepower is the capacity (potential) to destroy the
enemy's ability to deliver combat power [Ref. 3:p. 146]. An
element (a ship, for example) has suffered a firepower kill if
its combat power diminishes to zero, so it cannot contribute
combat power to its force.
Staving Rower is the capacity of a specific platform
to absorb damage and continue fighting with some measurable
effectiveness [Ref. 3:p. 289]. It is a measure of how many
hits the platform can absorb before losing its combat
effectiveness. Staying power is often the measure of how much
damage the platform can absorb before becoming useless (but
not necessarily sunk) in the naval battle under consideration.
S. Continuous Versus Pulse Weapons
Continuous weapons are those weapons causing a
continuous rate of attrition to the enemy (for example, main
battery guns of a platform). On the other hand, weapons that
are able to deliver instantaneous and great doses of
substantial combat power in pulses over long distances against
a target are called pulse weapons (torpedoes and missiles, for
example). We then distinguish the following terms:
* Continuous versus pulse theoretical combat power.
* Continuous versus pulse weapon effectiveness.
* Continuous versus pulse effective combat power.
20
9. Uncertainty in Naval Combat
"Uncertainty is inherent in combat" [Ref. 11: p.6-1].
This statement is included as one of the six basic axioms that
have been adopted by The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) in
order to understand and then model a combat situation.
Uncertainty is defined as "a state of doubt about the combat
situation, including the outcome" [Ref. 11:p. 6-2].
Uncertainty is often introduced by scouting inadequacy which
results in incomplete information about the enemy (personnel,
equipment, intentions, and so forth). Other sources of
uncertainty include the enemy's efforts for deception, and
doubt about the exact state of our own force at the time of
combat. The actual combat potential that will be activated by
the commander to generate combat power cannot be predicted in
advance (this is the difference between designed and actual
combat potential).
Even if everything concerning the enemy is known with
certainty, uncertainty about the outcome of the combat
(although reduced) will remain. This uncertainty is due to the
human factors involved. Since humans operate the military
equipment and make the decisions, it can be assumed that the
outcome of a battle will not be deterministic, regardless of
how good the technological development happens to be. A combat
leader certainly can make predictions using combat models that
are based on theoretical combat power or on the designed
21
combat potential of both sides, and so forth. However, to what
extent the output of a model can be trusted is another
question. How great must his model-predicted advantage be in
comparison with the enemy in order to be certain (for all
practical purposes) that his predicted victory will occur? The
following example illustrates an extreme case that is
deterministic. Side A is composed of one aircraft carrier and
eight frigates. Side B is composed of two destroyers only. In
such a case, the advantage of Side A is so great that, in this
hypothetical engagement, the victory of Side A is
deterministic. In other circumstances, when the advantage of
the one side is not so relevant, scouting effectiveness,
surprise, and other human factors may very well change the
situation, giving the advantage to the hypothetically inferior
(in terms of combat potential) side.
C. LANCHESTER'S MODEL5
Lanchester's model was one of the first combat models
developed and is still considered today a very important
model. Thus it is useful to describe it in this discussion of
combat theory.
5The concepts developed in this section were taken primarily from lectures given
by Prof. Samuel Parry in 1989 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
Also used are Reference 12, pages 6 to 10, and Reference 1, pages 369 to 375.
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Let X and Y be two forces, let x(t) and y(t) be the sizes
of these forces at time t, and let a and b be the attrition
rate coefficients for the X and Y forces, respectively.
1. Square Law
Two equations, commonly referred to as the sauare law,
are used to represent a situation where attrition to each side
is proportional to the number of units remaining on the other.
These two equations are presented in Figure 1.
dx(t) =_ ay(t)
dt
dy(t) = -bx(t) (1)
dt
Figure 1. Lanchester Model
Square Law
This law can also be considered as a concentration or
"aimed fire" law (a concept of modern warfare). This is so
because each shot from a unit of the X forces has a certain
probability of eliminating the unit of Y forces at which it is
aimed, with a probability of zero for eliminating any other
unit.
Using the square law, the attrition coefficient a
represents the quantity of casualties of X per firer of Y per
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minute. If x0 and Yo are the initial sizes of the X and Y
forces at the beginning of the engagement, and xf and yf are
the final numbers of survivors for each side, then the state
equation obtained by solving the differential equations of the
square law is
b(xo2 - xf 2 ) = a(y 2 - y 2). (2)
The state equation can be used to determine the value
yf if xf is zero, for instance. Or it can be used to determine
another value of yf, called the "break point", when say, xf =
0.2x0). It is also possible to determine the necessary and
sufficient condition for a force to win. If the battle is
continued to its finish (so either xf = 0 or yf = 0) then
X wins if x- > 1_
yo
and
Y wins if ° < 1 .yo
To determine the size of each force at time t, it is
necessary to convert the system (1) to a single second-order
differential equation involving x and y. To do this we
differentiate the first of the two equations in system (1) and
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substitute the second, obtaining the following second-order
differential equation:
d2 x bax 0. (3)d t 2
Solving this equation yields the size of the X force at time
t:
x(t) = - - 4x. eV-0t + -x o iy e-VUt (4)
where x(t) is the force level of X at time t.
To determine how long the battle will last, assume
that Y wins. Then x(t) is set equal to zero in Equation (4)





Another differential equation model is referred to as
the linear law. This law models area or unaimed f ire'. The
equations modeling the linear law are given in Figure 2.
dx(t) =_ ax(t)y(t)
dt
dy(t) = -bx(t)y(t) (6)
dt
Figure 2. Lanchester Model
Linear Law
Each shot that an X unit fires will eliminate all Y
units within some lethal area. All Y units are considered to
be uniformly distributed over the area that the Y force
occupies.
A linear law battle can be thought of as lasting for
an infinite length of time. With the linear law the derivative
dx/dy is the constant b/a, where the attrition coefficient a
represents the quantity of casualties of X per firer of Y per
6The linear law, in a slightly different mathematical form, can also be used to
model a series of duels. This form was said by Lanchester to describe ancient warfare,
and it has the linear law's state equation.
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target of X per minute (with a similar interpretation for the
attrition coefficient b). The state equation is given by
b(x, - x.) = a(y o - yf). (7)
The X force level as function of time is given by
( bx°-aY° if bxo *ayo
0o bxo~aYoe-(oayo)t ',Ix~
x(t) = (8)
Xo1 x if bxo=aY 
.
We may also have a situation in which the X force is
in the open field, and the Y force ambushes X (so that Y is
considered "hidden"). The Y force will conduct aimed fire
against X, and X will be attrited according to the square law.
At the same time X will conduct area fire against Y and Y will
be attrited according to the linear law. This mixed combat is




dy(t) = -bx(t)y(t) (9)
dt
Figure 3. Lanchester Model
Mixed Law
In this situation the state equation is given by
2(Xo - xf) = a(y o - y). (10)
This presentation of Lanchester's models here was for
the purpose of making it clear that the Lanchester models are
inadequate descriptions for modern naval combat. These models
do not take into account scouting and antiscouting effects,
staying power of a unit, or the effect when a force consists
of different kinds of ships. Most important of all, the effect
of pulse weapons (instantaneous delivery of substantial combat
power) is not taken into account by the Lanchester models.
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III. SUMMARIES OF TWO COMBAT MODELS
A. QUANTIFIED JUDGMENT MODEL (QJM)
1. Model Development
The Quantified Judgment Model (QJM) has been referred
to in the previous chapters. It is a methodology developed by
Col. T.N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, Ret., to assess historic land
combats. In order to account for weapon evolution, Dupuy
adapted Clausewitz's concepts for today's reality. Dupuy
begins his development by formulating an equation to represent
what Clausewitz had in mind for determining a battle's
outcome. All Llausewitz's theory about combat, which Dupuy
calls the "Law of Numbers," is summarized in his single
equation. [Ref. 4:p. 30] This equation is
P = N x VxQ (1)
where: P = Combat power
N = Numbers of troops
V = Variable circumstances affecting a force in
battle
Q = Quality of force.
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Dupuy also derived an equation to represent
Clausewitz's concept of a battle outcome [Ref. 4:p. 30]. The
battle outcome is defined by the following ratio of combat
power of the Red force to combat power of the Blue force:
Outcome = N. x V x Q. (2)Nb XVb X b
where: r = Red force identifier
b = Blue force identifier.
In order to develop his model, Dupuy made several
substitutions in Clausewitz's law of numbers. First, Dupuy
substituted force strength (S) for numbers of troops (N). Then
he introduced the operational factor Vf to replace V and
created his combat power equation as follows: [Ref. 4:p. 87]
P=SxVf×Q (3)
where: S = Force strength
V= Operational and environmental factor
Q = Troop quality factor.
Force strength S is a function of number of weapons,
lethality of weapons, and weapon effects (terrain, weather,
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season, and air superiority) [Ref. 7:p. 45]. Operational and
environmental factors Vf "represent the effect of the
circumstances of the combat on the force" [Ref. 4:p. 81].
Troop quality Q represents and incorporates several human
factors affecting a battle (leadership, morale, training, and
experience).
To compare power between forces a Combat Power Ratio
between the Red and Blue forces is defined by Dupuy as
follows:
Combat Power Ratio Pb (4)
P,
After the derivation of the combat power Equation (3),
an important question comes into play: how do you assign a
numerical value to Q? In order to quantify Q, Dupuy took
another step. He substituted relative combat effectiveness for
troop quality (Q). To define combat effectiveness for QJM, we
need to define theoretical combat power and the actual battle
results equation.
Theoretical combat power (P') of a force can be
thought of as the designed combat power for this force. It is
a function of the force strength as well as operational and
environmental factors. As expected, it is expressed much the
same as combat power as defined above, after the troop quality
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factor Q is omitted (or set "ideally" to the value of 1).
Formally, theoretical combat power is given by
=S X V. (5)
Similar to Equation (4), the theoretical combat power
ratio between the Blue and Red forces is defined by the
equation
Theoretical Combat Power Ratio - (6)
pr
The theoretical combat power ratio represents a
predictio of the outcome of a hypothetical engagement between
Blue and Red forces when there is no difference in fighting
quality between them.
The term actual battle results is used by Dupuy to
represent the actual outcome of a historical battle. It is a
function of three factors: mission accomplishment, ability to
hold or gain a ground, and force effectiveness when casualties
have occurred. These three factors are defined as follows:
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* Mission factor (MF): an "expert" judgment of the extent to
which a force accomplished its assigned or perceived
mission.
* Spatial effectiveness (Esp): a value representing the
extent to which a force was able to gain or hold ground.
* Casualty effectiveness (Ecas): a value representing the
efficiency of the force in terms of casualties, taking
into consideration the strengths of the two sides and the
casualties incurred by both sides. [Ref. 4:p. 88)
These three factors are summed to give the actual
battle results. The actual battle results eauation is
R 7 MF + Esp + Ecas. (7)
The mission accomplishment factor is purely subjective
and values are assigned to it by Dupuy on a scale from 1 - 10,
as presented in Table III. [Ref. 5:p. 231]
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TABLE III. DUPUY'S MISSION FACTORS
Mission Description Ranae Normal
Complete accomplishment of the 7-10 8
mission
Substantial, relatively 5-7 6
satisfactory accomplishment
Partial, less than satisfactory 3-5 4
accomplishment
Little achievement of the mission 1-3 2
Spatial effectiveness (Esp), which is the ability to
hold or gain ground, is a function of the relative strengths
of the two forces, the relative depths of the areas occupied
by each, the average daily distance of advance or withdrawal,
and the military posture of forces (attack, defense, and so
forth)7 [Ref. 7:p. 48). It is not necessary for purposes of
this thesis to define or analyze the equations representing
Esp.
Casualty effectiveness (Ecas) is a function of the
relative average daily number of casualties, the relative
force strength, the military posture of the forces, the total
7Spatial effectiveness is defined mathematically in Reference 5, page 48. A
modified equation that makes more sense from a military standpoint is given in
Reference 7, page 53.
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number of personnel in the force, and the vulnerability of the
force8.
After calculating the results for both the Red and the
Blue forces, the actual outcome of the battle is given by the
Actual Battle Results Ratio as follows:
Actual Battle Results Ratio -Rb (8)
R1
It is not reasonable to assume that the theoretical
outcome in Equation (6) would be the same as the actual
outcome in Equation (8) because human factors almost always
affect the battle (as well as the factor of chance or luck).
So it is plausible to say that the difference between the
actual battle results ratio (actual outcome) and the
theoretical combat power ratio (theoretical outcome) is due
chiefly to human factors.
From the previous definitions and interpretations, we
now define combat effectiveness (CEV) as the ratio between
actual and theoretical outcome. In mathematical terms, combat
effectiveness for the Red force is defined as follows: [Ref.
4:p. 89]




Dupuy defines the combat effectiveness of the Blue
force (CEVb) as the reciprocal of the combat effectiveness for
the Red force (CEV,). It seems reasonable that the combat
effectiveness for the Red force is equivalent to its troop
quality factor (Q). Therefore, Dupuy redefines combat power
for the Red force as
PZ = S x Vf Evz = P' x CEV1 . (10)
Equivalently, substituting CEV, from Equation (9), we
have
Pr Rb P
Finally, in order to use the model to analyze
historical battles, a new combat power ratio is defined. The
combat power ratio defined in QJM [Ref. 7:p 33] was found to
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be inconsistent by Ciano during his study of the model [Ref.
7]. Ciano subsequently proposed a relative combat power
equation which is presented in Figure 4. This equation is the
final product of QJM and may be used to evaluate the outcome
of an historical combat.
Relative Combat Power (Blue force) = SbxVfxV-Eb
Relative Combat Power (Red force) = SZxVfxUEEV
SbxVfb
Figure 4. Ciano's Relative Combat Power Equation for the
QJM
The force that possesses a relative combat power
greater than 1 is considered the superior force and would win.
2. Strengths and Weaknesses of Dupuy's Model
The QJM is a very useful model. It draws considerable
information from historical battles and yields important
conclusions for the future. It includes Clausewitz's theory
and is based on Dupuy's many years of experience. It was
developed by Dupuy and his associates over a considerable
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period of time and was validated against historical real-world
combat data. Although it has already been used to study
historical battles, its basic equation for relative combat
power (the one that was used to determine the outcome of a
combat) was found to be inconsistent by Ciano, as reported in
his thesis. The modification, suggested by Ciano in Figure 4,
is very reasonable and seems to work well.
A point of weakness in the QJM is the definition of
the mission accomplishment factor; it is a completely
subjective measure. Because of the form of the actual battle
results Equation (7), mission accomplishment often dominates
the more objective factors (losses and territory exchanged).
To show one difficulty, note that losing a battle is sometimes
considered a successful mission accomplishment by a level of
command (if the enemy was delayed appropriately, or if the
enemy suffered greater losses).
Another weakness in QJM is that force strength is
based on historical data to obtain comparative values. Also,
the model has so far proven most useful to analyze historical
data. Though Dupuy claims great power for it, other Army
analysts believe its value for predicting future outcome in a
battle is uncertain. Moreover, the model does not account for
the dynamics of combat such as tactics on the battlefield, the
effect of maneuver and suppression, and the problem of
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distribution of force over a battlefield to obtain the best
combat power. [Ref. 9:p. 96]
Finally, Dupuy's model is designed for ground combat
and cannot be easily adapted to naval combat without extensive
revision, including research into historical naval battles.
B. A NAVAL COMBAT MODEL
The model to be discussed next is a pure naval combat
model. As stated earlier, it was developed by Lt. Thomas Beall
in his thesis and is based on Hughes' naval warfare concepts
[Ref. 8:pp. 5-31]. (The reader who is interested in more
details should refer to that thesis.) Although the model deals
with both continuous and pulse weapons, we will concentrate
here on the continuous weapon case for two reasons:
* We are going to deal with pulse weapons in the next
chapter, and
* Missiles are today's most important naval weapons but they
are not included in Beall's work.
Beall's model serves two purposes. First, it may be used
to study historical naval battles and compare their actual
outcomes with the model predictions. Second, the model can be
used as a tactical planning tool for a decision maker.
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1. Definitions
The following definitions (together with the combat
theory developed in Chapter II) are needed to understand
Beall's model:
0 1000-Dound bomb eguivalent (TPBE): a measure of
destruction. It is equal to the explosive power of 660
pounds of TNT (equivalent to the explosive power of a
1000-pound bomb in the Second World War). The explosive
power of all weapons is expressed in multiples of TPBEs.
* Theoretical combat 2ower (FC): the number of TPBEs per
minute which a platform's main battery guns can fire.
* Weavon effectiveness (PC): the probability that a shell
fired from a group's main battery gun will hit the aimed
target.
* Effective combat power (EFC): the number of TPBEs that
hit their targets per minute.
* Stayina Rower (SP) of a platform: the number of TPBEs
necessary to inflict a firepower kill on that platform.




1 = Blue force
'= Red force.
The function of the model is summarized in the
following paragraph:
Naval combat is modeled as a force-on-force attrition
process. Component groupings of each force are portrayed
as aggregations of the SP and FC values of their
individual platforms. Attrition is computed in discrete
time steps and is represented by the simultaneous
degradation of each force's aggregate SP and FC over time.
[Ref. 8:p. 7]
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2. Characteristic Values for a Platform
The staying power, measured in TPBE hits, of platform
j in group k in force 1, based on historical data, was derived
in Appendix A of Reference 8 as the expression
SPiki = 0.070 x (full load displacement) /3  (1)
where full load displacement is a characteristic of a ship9 .
The theoretical combat power of main battery gun i in
platform j in group k in force 1 (that is, the number of TPBEs
fired from the specific gun i per minute) is computed
according to the formula
= weightFCJkl = 6601bs x wtg (2)
where: weight = Explosive weight that the main battery gun
fires per minute (in pounds of TNT)
wtg = 2.5, an empirically derived multiplier to
account for the greater kinetic energy of
the shell relative to a bomb at the impact
point.
We use the same notation as that adopted by Beal in his thesis.
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The theoretical combat power of a platform j in group
k in force 1 is given by summing the FC of each main battery
gun in the platform
FCjkl = i FCjk1  (3)
In the summation of Equation (3), platform j is fixed in the
group k of the Blue force 1. Thus the summation is taking
place over all weapons i in that platform.
The values of the aggregate staying power (SP) and
theoretical combat power (FC) of a group k in force 1, fired
as a single unit, are given by
SPkl = j SPJki Vk, V1, (4)
j e k
and FCl = 1: FCjkl Vk, V1. (5)
j ekJ
The symbol j e k refers to platform j assigned to group k. In
the summations k is fixed and j varies over all platforms in
group k.
Finally, the effective combat power (EFC) of group k
in force 1 is computed according to the equation
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EFCkl = FCkl x PCkl. (6)
3. Model Description
As mentioned above, the aggregate values of staying
power (SP) and theoretical combat power (FC) of all the groups
are recomputed in each discrete time step (say 1.0 minute).
The terms SPkj(t) and FCkl(t) are the aggregates of SP and FC
of group k in force 1 at time step t.
If l' represents the attacking force, the aggregate
value of staying power (SP) of the groups under attack is
defined as follows:
TS(t) = b SPkl (t-1) (7)
k being at.!acked by I"
where: SPkl(t-1) = Staying power of group k belonging to
force 1 at the end of the (t-1) time
step.
The aggregate effective combat power (AEFC) of the
attacking groups is computed as follows:
AEFC(t) = E FCr(t-l) x PC, (8)
k firing from V1
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where: FCkL,(t-l) = Theoretical combat power of group k
belonging to force 1' at the end of
the (t-l) time step.
The ratio of AEFC to TS is defined as the defender's
continuous fire loss percentage (LC). Thus,
LC = AEFC (9)
TS
Finally, if the continuous fire loss percentage (LC)
is considered to be applied to the staying power (SP) and
theoretical combat power (FC), these values can be computed
for each iterative time step as follows:
{ SPk(t-1) x (I-LC) Vk under attack (10)
SPkl( t) =
SPkl (t-1) otherwise. (11)




Once the updated values of SP and FC are computed we
can compute the total values of each force at every discrete
time step t according to the formula
SPI(t) = SPk1(t) (14)k
and FC1 ( t) = FCkl(t). (15)
k
These total values represent the aggregate staying power (SP)
and the theoretical combat power (FC) at the end of the time
step t.
4. Model Interpretation
The above model was implemented using a computer
program that calculates attrition at each time step against
the groups under attack. Specifically, the program does the
following:
* Starts and stops the continuous fire based on the duration
of the fire.
* Computes the attrition for both forces at each time step
based on which groups of the opposing forces are the
attackers and which are the targets of each attacker.
* Stops the engagement based on either the number of steps
to be run (specified by the user), or the maximum
acceptable percent loss in staying power of each force
(specified also by the user), whichever is greater.
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5. Discussion of the Model
The overall performance of the model can be summarized
as follows [Ref. 8:p. 16]. The model
* Portrays naval forces as aggregations of the staying power
and theoretical combat power of heterogeneous mixes of
platforms.
* Models the engagement of these forces as a force-on-force
attrition process with attrition suffered via continuous
fire and/or through the impact of pulse weapons.
• Permits the user to vary the inputs concerning the time,
strength, target, and duration of each force's fire in
order to explore each force's tactical options.
* Computes attrition to the opposing forces simultaneously
throughout the engagement and provides a result in terms
of the percent SP and FC lost by each force.
We believe this model is a very credible and promising
one. The main disadvantages that can be distinguished are:
* The model does not deal with missiles. We believe that the
most important weapon in today's naval combat is the
missile.
* To compute some values (SP for example), the model uses
historical data. Thus we do not know if the computed
values reflect today's technological developments. This
weakness cannot be corrected because the existing data
from recent naval combats are not sufficient.
" The model does not incorporate human factors.
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C. COMPARISON OF THE TWO MODELS
Although the two models presented above provide very
different approaches and are constructed for different kinds
of combat, we now make a side-by-side comparison, being aware
that it is a crude one.
* Both models use the term theoretical combat power with roughly
the same meaning.
* Dupuy's combat effectiveness and Beall's weapon effectiveness are
somewhat related, but they have different meanings. CEV,
in Dupuy's model, refers explicitly to human factors and
its values are not restricted. Weapon effectiveness (PC)
is a probability (and is restricted between 0.0 and 1.0).
0 Dupuy's force strength also is related to Beall's weapon
effectiveness but the two terms refer to different
quantities (weapon effectiveness is a probability whereas
force strength varies from 500 to 500,000).
* Beall's effective combat power and Dupuy's combat power have
roughly the same meaning.
* Beall's equation EFC = FC x PC and Dupuy's P = S x Vf x Q
are similar, but Beall makes no provision for human
factors.
* The disadvantages of the QJM model are that it does not
account for (1) tactics on the battlefield, (2) scouting-
antiscouting effects, (3) staying power of platforms and
pulse weapons, and (4) naval battle data.
* The main disadvantage of Beall's model is that it does not
take into account human factors and the factor of chance
or luck.
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IV. A MODERN NAVAL COMBAT MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
As previously emphasized, today's sea battles and sea
control are based primarily on one weapon: the missile. For
this reason we will develop a model to represent missile
combat. As stated before, missiles are considered to be pulse
weapons because they deliver instantaneously a great amount of
firepower against a selected target. The model is developed as
a force-on-force attrition process and will be based on a
simple concept.
What is of most interest in a naval combat? Generally,
the losses suffered on each side and, consequently, the
remaining staying power and theoretical combat power of each
force after losses have occurred. We previously defined
staying power as the number of hits a platform can absorb
before suffering a firepower kill. So, if we consider a force
fighting as a single unit, we can define the aggregate staying
power of a force as the sum of the total theoretical number of
hits each platform can absorb and still continue fighting. If
we consider the ratio of hits received by one force in one
firepower pulse divided by its staying power, the result will
be the percentage loss of this force incurred in this pulse
(that is, hits received divided by hits that can be absorbed
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before being destroyed). In the model this percentage loss
will be computed in discrete time steps for each force and
then used to determine the remaining staying power and
theoretical combat power of each force at the end of every
discrete time step.
We will also incorporate in our model the effect of human
factors issues such as scouting effectiveness, training,
morale, and leadership. These effects will be incorporated
implicitly in terms of some degraders in combat effectiveness
of each force.
In the model we deal with a particular type of missile, a
typical surface-to-surface antiship missile. This is necessary
because the specifications for different kinds of missiles
vary enormously (technology used, explosive material, weight
of the explosive material, speed, guidance technique, and so
forth). Of course the model is general enough so that it can
be adjusted easily to include other types of missiles by
assigning appropriate values to the parameters of the model.
For the simple case of missiles with approximately the same
type of explosive material, technology, and guidance
technique, we use a single multiplier, W,, to account for the
different weights of the explosive material. The W, multiplier




1. Individual Platform Case
In the context of the combat theory already presented,
we redefine the main parameters used in our model.
Indices used in the model are as follows:
j = Platform of the Blue force
j'= Platform of the Red force
k = Group of platforms constituting the Blue force
k'= Group of platforms constituting the Red force
b = Blue force
r = Red force
Staving Power (SP): The number of hits a platform can
absorb before suffering a firepower kill. Staying power
depends on the kind of enemy missile. Although the data used
to develop the formula for staying power in Beall's model
(page 41) are drawn from World Wars I and II, the fact that
there is little new data, especially for missiles, compels us
to use this same formula for our approximation. Moreover, the
formula has been tested for different values of full load
displacement, and for an average or nominal type of missile
the resulting damage was found to be reasonable. Thus, the
staying power of platform j in group k for the Blue force is
given by the equation
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SPfj,, = 0.070 x (full load displacement)1 /3. (1)
We note here that SP was measured by Beall in units of 1000-
pound bomb equivalent (TPBE) hits. We assume that our nominal
missile has a destructive value of one TPBE. This is done for
simplicity, without deviating significantly from reality.
Therefore, for the remainder of the thesis SP is in units of
nominal missile hits, and is the number of nominal hits a ship
can take before firepower kill, as a function of its
displacement.
Theoretical combat Rower (P): This is the number of
missiles that can be fired from a unit in a single salvo. The
number of missiles that can be fired in a salvo by unit j in
group k for the Blue force is given by the equation
Pjk= Mjk XW (2)
where: Mjkb = The theoretical number of missiles that a unit
j of group k in the Blue force can fire in a
single salvo.
W, = A multiplicative factor to be used for
missiles based on approximately the same
technology to account for the different
weights of explosive material. For example, if
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one side uses a missile with twice as much
explosive material as our nominal missile,
then W, is 2.0 and the side has double the
theoretical combat power. The multiplier W,
can be ignored if both sides use a missile
that is equivalent of our nominal one-TPBE
missile.
Effective combat power or combat effectiveness (E):
The number of missiles that hit their target per salvo. The
effective combat power of platform j' in group k' in the Red
force is given by
Efk = Mf M x W, x PRf Z (3)
where: PRj.k-r = The probability that a missile fired from
unit j' in group k' in the Red force hits
its target.
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The value of PR can be calculated as follows:
PRfr=n H - (HX J (4)
where: H = For each missile the probability of striking
an undefended target (for the same type of
missiles H is the same for all units in the
force). In other words H represents the
firing accuracy and is given for each type of
missile.
Njkb = The number of missiles a defender (j platform
in k group in the Blue force) can shoot down
per salvo (the best he can do).
The formula given in Equation (4) was derived from the
following reasoning. H is the conditional probability of a
hit, given that the missile will not be shot down, or
mathematically H = P[hit/not shot down]. Clearly P[hit/shot
down] = 0. Since we cannot know the exact probability that the
defender will shoot down a missile, we can use the estimate
P.. We know that an estimate of this probability is given by
P5 = Njkb/Mj~k.r* So using the law of total probability we have
PR = P(hit) = Hx(1-P,) + OxP, = Hx(1-P.) = Hx(1-Njk/Mjfkf.)
which is equivalent to Equation (4).
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For instance, suppose that a Blue unit fires against
a Red one. If the Blue unit can fire four missiles in a salvo,
the Red unit defending can shoot down two missiles, and the
firing accuracy (H) for the Blue missile is 0.8, then the
probability that a Blue missile will hit the Red unit (PR) is
0.8 - (0.8 x 2/4), or 0.4.
Substituting Equation (4) in Equation (3), the
effective combat power of platform j' in group k' of the Red
force can be written as
Efkr= (M,,x W x H) - (N,,,xW,,x H). (5)
Although the above formula is mathematically correct,
observe that the righthand part of the equation applies when
the defender shoots down missiles without knowing if they are
going to hit him. For a modern naval missile combat frequently
the defender can determine which missiles are a threat and
shoots down only the ones that will hit him. For this case H
does not apply to the second term in the righthand part of the
equation, resulting in the following modified equation:
Efie = (MfKI x wm X H - x (6)
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Which is preferable, Equation (5) or Equation (6)?
Consider separately, first, offensive combat power Pj'k'r = M.k.Z
x W, (interpreted as missiles that can be fired per salvo by
platform j' in Red force), and second, defensive combat power
Djkb = Njkb x Wm (interpreted as missiles that can be shot down
per salvo by platform j in Blue force). The effective combat
power of platform j', which represents the net number of
missiles that could hit, is then given by Ej.k-r = Pj'k-, - Djkbo
Case 1 (Eauation (511
Shooter fires Mj'k,r missiles, and defender shoots down
Njkb of them (without knowing which will hit). In this case we
have the following equation:
EJ.k.. = H x Milk. - W, x H x Milk., - Nj )
So, we examine which missiles hit after defender acts. For
instance, suppose a Red platform fires against Blue using
nominal missiles (Wm is ignored). Furthermore, suppose the
missile hit probability H = 0.5. Red fires a salvo of four
missiles. Blue shoots down two without knowing which of the
four will hit. The remaining two will hit Blue with
probability 0.5, and so one may be expected to hit. Using the
formula Ejik'r = H x (Mjok.
, 
- Njkb) = 0.5 x (4-2) = 1, we see that
the result is consistent. This model is useful when the
defender uses AAW surface-to-air missiles at long range before
he knows which enemy missile will acquire and hit him.
55
Case 2 (Eauation (6))
Shooter again fires MJk', missiles. The defender sees
which of the missiles (that is, HxM.k.Z) will hit. Thus, the
defender shoots down NJkb out of HxMj'kr missiles. In this case
we use Equation (6):
Ej-k.Z = H x PJk., - Djb = W, x (H x Mjk.-, - NJk)
Using the same scenario as in case 1, a Red platform fires a
salvo of four missiles against Blue with hit probability H =
0.5. The expected number that can hit is therefore two. The
defender, using the means he possesses, is informed which two
will hit and shoots both of them down. Thus, he will suffer
zero hits. Using our formula we find Ej'k-r = H x Mj'k-r - Njkb =
(0.5x4)-2 = 0. We conclude that Equation (6) is consistent.
Case 2 is most appropriate for our situation, in which
"point" (close in) defenses are used. This situation occurs
frequently against sea-skimming missiles in the terminal
defense phase. We think Equation (6) is closer to reality for
a modern missile naval combat, and hereafter in our
development assume Equation (6) to be the case. When we
suspect the defender's capabilities are overestimated, the
value of Njkb (number of defeated missiles) should be adjusted
appropriately.
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Equation (6) represents the effective combat power of
a single Red platform firing against a single defended Blue
platform, and it is measured in hits inflicted on the Blue
platform. It will be convenient for our model to define
effective combat power of the attacking force in terms of the
destroyed staying power of the defending force. In order to
accomplish this we divide Equation (6) by the staying power
(SP) of the defending (Blue) force. We call the resulting
fraction of destroyed staying power LOSS. If Red is attacking
and Blue defending, the fraction of destroyed staying power of
platform j in group k of Blue, (which also represents the
effective combat power of platform j' in group k' of Red) is
as follows:
LOSSjc = (Mfez x Wm x H) - (Nik x Wi)
W x [(Mj., x H) - Njjb]. (7)
SPjkb
Note that LOSSjkb should be a number between 0.0 and
1.0. A negative value of LOSS means that the Blue force is
able to shoot down more missiles than the Red force is able to
fire in a single salvo. In that case we set the Blue force
LOSSkb equal to 0.0. When LOSSjkb has a value greater than 1.0,
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it means that the Red force fired more missiles than needed to
completely destroy all of Blue's staying power, resulting in
Red "overkill." In that case the Blue force has no remaining
staying power and has suffered a firepower kill. Of course, if
just the right number of missiles are not spread efficiently
over the defenders, "overkill" is desirable.
Up to now, and before we introduce human factors,
first observe that our model has an advantage over Beall's
model: our model takes into account the capability of the
defending force. Next we incorporate several human factor
components.
In the combat theory presented in Chapter II, we
emphasized the importance of scouting. Scouting is defined as
the means to gather any type of useful information about the
enemy. Define a to be the scouting function with values
between 0.0 and 1.0. The scouting function a is applied to the
attacking force. Also, the readiness of the defending force to
defend is clearly important. Define c to be the alertness
modifier for the defending force, with values again between
0.0 and 1.0. Incorporating the scouting function a and the
alertness modifier v, Equation (6) becomes
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LOSSj = Wm x (or x Mfe, x H - b X Njb) (8)
where: or = Scouting function of the attacking Red force
(same for all the red units)
Tb = Alertness modifier of the defending Blue force
(same for all the blue units).
If the attacking force is fully informed of its
opponent's posture, and the defending force is fully alert,
then or = Tb = 1.0 and Equation (8) reduces to Equation (7).
If the attacking force has no information about the enemy,
then o, = 0.0 and there are no hits (LOSSjkb will be negative
or 0.0). If the Blue force has no information about the enemy,
they have no alertness. The Red force then ambushes Blue using
effective scouting. In this case Or = 1.0 and 'rb = 0.0,
resulting in the following loss equation:
LOSSjb = Wm x (o x MfJxH) (9)SPftMbr
Analysis of this last equation helps us understand the
importance of surprise in a naval combat.
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Now, what procedure should we use for determining a
and x for both sides? Our recommendation is that the user
should assign a value between 0.0 and 1.0 to both the scouting
and alertness functions, according to the specific scenario.
If the model is used to evaluate historical battles, then the
existing historical data will determine the appropriate
values. If the model is used to estimate the outcome of a
future battle, then the tactical commander will base his
estimate on the specific tactical situation. If the tactical
commander believes he is not able to assign values for a and
T, then he also will not be able to assess the weapons
effectiveness of his or the opposing side. As will be seen
from the numerical examples that follow, scouting and
alertness effectiveness are as decisive as firepower.
Up to now we have assumed full combat potential on
both sides. However, as discussed in Chapter II, combat power
is determined not by the designed combat potential, but by the
available combat potential. We defined M,. as the number of
missiles the unit j' can fire in a single salvo. However, this
number is the theoretical maximum, or the "best" that unit j'
can do. The real number of missiles that can be fired by a
unit in action is a function of personnel training, morale,
leadership, and sometimes chance or luck. In general, human
factors come into play. In order to introduce these effects,
we use a multiplicative degrader m that has a value between
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0.0 and 1.0.10 If the leader exploits every possible factor,
personnel training and morale are at their maximum levels, and
there is no accidental failure, then the particular unit can
fire M missiles per salvo and m = 1.0. If, on the other hand,
personnel morale is l'w (possibly after severe casualties have
occurred) and it is Impossible to return the enemy's fire,
then m = 0.0. In all other cases, m has a value between 0.0
and 1.0. Hence Equation (7) can be modified as follows:
LOSSjW - Wm x (or x Myer x x H -Zb X Njb) (10)
SPjkb
Using a similar argument, it is reasonable to assume
that generally the defender will not shoot down N missiles,
but rather Nxn, where n is a multiplicative factor with values
between 0.0 and 1.0. In effect, n acts with N in exactly the
same way that m acts with M. Incorporating this refinement,
the percentage loss of staying power for the defending (Blue)
platform j in group k (which also represents the effective
combat power of platform j' fired against j for the Red
force), has the representation
1 Note that m affects both launch availability (M) and firing accuracy (H) caused
by deficiencies in leadership, morale, and training.
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LOSSjk S - W X [(os x Mfl x mfr XH x HNj x njkb)] (11)
SPjkb
Again, if the model is used to evaluate historical
battles from existing data, it would not be difficult to
determine the appropriate values for m and n for both sides.
When a commander uses the model for estimating the outcome of
a future naval combat, then he must make an estimate of the
values of m and n based on the particular tactical scenario,
his personnel's morale and training, and all the information
he has about the enemy. An in-depth study of recent historical
battles can greatly help to determine the proper values for
these two multipliers.
As noted previously, the percentage loss of each force
and the remaining staying power and theoretical combat power
for both forces will be computed in discrete time steps. If we
define SPjkb(t-l), and Pjkb(t-l) to be the staying power and
theoretical combat power respectively of platform j in group
k for Blue at the end of the time step (t-l), then using
LOSSjkb (Equation 11), we can compute the remaining staying
power and theoretical combat power of platform j in group k
for the Blue force at the end of time step t as follows:
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SPjkb(t-l) x (1-LOSSjk b ) Vj under attack
SSPjkb (t-l) otherwise.
Pjkb(t-l) x (1-LOSSjk b ) Vj under attack
Pjk,(t0 = (13)
Pjkb(t-1) otherwise.
It is reasonable to assume that after a unit has been
hit (received a pulse) its ability to shoot down missiles (N)
will be reduced according to its loss of staying power. So,
after a unit suffers a hit we update the value of N as
follows:
Njkb(t-1) x (I-LOSSjkb ) Vj under attack
Nk,(t) = (14)
Njk (t-1) otherwise.
Before proceeding to the aggregation of units into
groups it would be helpful to clarify the concepts and
equations developed so far by giving a numerical example. We
consider the simplest case of naval combat; the one between
two single platforms.
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2. Example 1: Individual Platform Case
Assume that both the Red and Blue forces consist of
one FF having the characteristics presented in Table IV. We
give one advantage to the Red FF of being able to fire four
missiles while the Blue FF is able to fire only three. We
assume there are no reloads and each force can fire only one
pulse. We assume also that the two forces have the same
scouting and alertness potential and use the same type of
missiles which are fired almost simultaneously. All the other
characteristics and human factors issues are assumed to be the
same for both forces. Since the same type of missiles
(nominal) is assumed for both forces, the multiplicative
factor W, is omitted.
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TABLE IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF RED AND BLUE SHIPS
Factor Blue FF Red FF
Full load displacement Db = 4000 D, = 4000
Staying power (computed) SPb = 1.11 S= 1.11
Missiles per salvo Mb = 3 Mr = 4
Multipl. degrader for M mb = 0.8 m, = 0.8
Shots down per salvo Nb = 2 Nr = 2
Multipl. degrader for N nb = 0.8 n. = 0.8
Scouting function Ob = 0.8 or = 0.8
Alertness modifier rb = 0.8 Tr = 0.8
Probability of hit H = 0.9
Theoretical combat power for both forces:
Red force: Pr = Mr = 4 hits per salvo
Blue force: Pb = Mb = 3 hits per salvo
Percentage loss for both forces:
Red force: LOSSr = (obxMbxmbxH - ',rxNrxn) / SPr =
(0.8x3x0.8x0.9 - 0.8x2x0.8)/1.11 = 0.40
(or, a loss of 40% in the Red force)
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Blue force: LOSSb = (arxMrxmrxH - TbxNbxnb) / SPb =
(0.8x4x0.8xO.9 - 0.8x2xO.8)/l.11 = 0.92
(or, a loss of 92% in the Blue force)
Remaining stavina Rower and theoretical combat power
Red force: SP, =SPrx(l-LOSSr) = l.Iix(l-0.40)=0.67
Pr =Prx(l-LOSS) = 4x(1-0.40) = 2.4
Blue force: SPb =SPbx(-LOSSb) = 1.11x(1-0.92)=0.09
Pb =Pbx(I-LOSSb) = 3x(1-0.92) = 0.24
So, after a battle in which the two sides exchange
missile salvoes, the Red FF has a 40% loss with remaining
staying power 0.67 (instead of its original 1.11) and
remaining theoretical combat power of 2.4 (instead of 4). The
Blue FF has a loss of 92% with remaining staying power 0.09
(instead of 1.11) and theoretical combat power of 0.24
(instead of 3). However, neither side has reloads, so the
missile battle is over. We observe that Blue has suffered
almost a firepower kill, while Red has more than half of its
initial staying power (SP) and theoretical combat power (P).
This is noteworthy because Red started with only a 4:3
advantage in combat power (missiles fired) but no advantage in
defensive firepower or in other respects.
Next let's consider the same scenario, except that the
Blue FF due to effective scouting (Ob = Tb = 1.0) has every
possible knowledge about the enemy and is able to ambush the
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better-armed Red FF. Red is not totally surprised, however,
and has defensive alertness (v = 0.8). After the attack, Red
FF gains targeting information about the enemy (ar = 0.8) and
returns the fire, but only after being hit by the pulse of
Blue missiles. All other values are kept exactly the same as
before. In this situation we have the following computations:
PercentaQe loss for Red force:
LOSSr = (GbxMbxmbxH - -rxNrxnr) / SPr
= (i.Ox3xO.8x0.9 - 0.8x2xO.8)/i.1l = 0.79
(or, a loss of 79% in the Red force)
Remaining stayina Rower and theoretical combat Rower for
Red force:
SP = SPrx(I-LOSS,) = 1.1x(1-0.79) = 0.23
Pr = Prx(l-LOSS,) = 4x(1-0.79) = 0.84
So, the Red force can return the fire with only 0.84 combat
power remaining instead of 4. The result of Red's reduced
salvo is
Percentage loss for Blue force:
LOSSb = (axMrxmrxH - bxNbxnb) / SP b
= (0.8x0.84x0.8xO.9 - lPOx2xO.8)/l.ll = -1.0
(or, a loss of 0.0% in the Blue force)
Remaining staving Rower and theoretical combat ower for
Blue force:
67
The negative LOSSb indicates that the Blue FF is able
to shoot down more missiles than Red can now fire. Thus, Blue
has zero losses, and 100% of its staying power and theoretical
combat power remain, while Red suffers about 80% losses. This
example illustrates the importance of surprise and effective
scouting in a naval combat: a force with inferior combat
potential can defeat a stronger force if it exploits its
advantage in human factors. History justifies our reasoning.
3. Aggregation of Units into Groups
As described in the combat theory chapter, the term
"group" refers to the subdivision of a force and a group may
consist of several units. If we consider a group firing as a
unit, then the aggregate staying power of group k in the Red
force is given by
SP = jSPjkb V k. (15)
ek
The aggregate percentage loss of group k of the
(defending) Blue force, which also represents the destroyed
staying power of group k, or equivalently the aggregate
effective combat power of group k' of the (attacking) Red
force (measured in destroyed staying power of the group under
attack) is given by
68
L xsxWmx 2 MfK xmfje - ?bxWx Jkb Jk (16)LOSSj k= f can be used
SPkb
We note here that the first summation symbol in
Equation (16) is used to sum the missiles from all the
platforms belonging to group k' that fire missiles. In other
words, for a particular situation at hand, there may be some
ships that do not fire (because of the formation, or because
there are friendly ships or land in the line of fire, or
because their weapons fail). For this reason, missiles only
from the ships that actually do fire a particular salvo are
summed. Here then is another important domain where leadership
plays a critical role: a good leader exploits every possible
factor so that all ships are able to fire at the crucial
moment.
If SPkb(t-1) is the staying power of group k in the
Blue force at the end of time step (t-l), then the aggregate
staying power of all Blue groups under attack is given by
E SPk (t-i). (17)
k being attacked
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Also, if P,.r(t-l) is the theoretical combat power of
group k' belonging to the Red force at the end of time step
(t-1), the aggregate theoretical combat power of the attacking
(Red) groups is given by
PM= P (t-). (18)
K is firing
Finally, if the aggregate percentage loss Equation
(16) is applied to the staying power and theoretical combat
power, their aggregate remaining values are computed
iteratively from the previous time step according to the
following equations:
SPk,(t-1) x (1-LOSSxb) Vk under attackSPa,(t) = (19)
SPk ( t-l) otherwise.
Pk,(t-l) x (1-LOSS ) Vk under attack
Pk (t-Z) otherwise.
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Also, the percentage loss can be applied to the
ability (N) of the group to defend (shoot down missiles). At
the end of each discrete time step we update the value of N as
follows:
SNkb(t-1) x (1-LOSSkb) Vk under attack
N (t) -- (21)
Nkb (t-1) otherwise.
When we have computed the updated values of SP and P
for the attacking groups and the groups under attack for both
forces, we use the following formulas to calculate the
remaining total values for each force at every discrete time
step t:
SPb(t) = SPkb (t), (22)
k
Pb( t ) = Pkb(t) (23)
The values in Equations (22) and (23) represent the
aggregates of the remaining staying power and theoretical
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combat power at the end of the time step t. These values are
then used to determine the naval combat outcome.
4. Input Parameters and Model Interpretation
In order to use the model, the user must determine the
following inputs and model parameters:
0 The composition of each force (number of groups, and
number and type of units in each group).
0 The staying power (SP) of each platform in both forces.
The formula proposed in Equation (1) may be used to
determine the SP.
0 The number of missiles that can be fired per salvo (M) by
each platform in both forces.
* The multiplicative factor W, to account for the different
weight in a missiles' warhead used by one force, if any.
In order to avoid more complicated formulas, we assume
homogeneity of missiles fired by each force in one pulse
(in other words, W, is the same for every unit in the
force in each discrete time step t). It is easy to adjust
the model to accommodate cases where different units in
one force use different kinds of missiles in the same
pulse, simply by summing all Wj for every unit j in the
force.
* The number of missiles (N) that theoretically can be shot
down by each unit in both forces.
* The theoretical probability of hit (H) on an undefended
target for the type of missile used in the model. We
assume that both forces use the same type of missiles. If
not, a different value of H can be used for each force.
* The scouting function a, the alertness modifier v, and the
multiplicative degraders m and n to account for the effect
of human factor issues for all platforms in both forces.
* Generally, the length of the discrete time steps. At the
end of each step the remaining staying power and
theoretical combat power for both forces will be
calculated. Here is assumed that the duration of the
discrete time steps is such that, during one time step,
each force receives no more than one pulse.
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* Optionally, the breaking point of each force; in other
words, the lowest acceptable loss percentage of each force
below which that particular force will be considered
defeated and the battle terminated.
0 The maximum number of salvoes each side can fire. This
depends on the availability of missiles. For a missile
combat, because of the limited number of missiles a
platform can carry, no more than three or four pulses are
generally expected by each group.
* The platforms which will be the targets of the other
groups. Each group is considered as fighting as a unit,
and we treat the aggregate values for the whole group. In
order to do this, we assume that all the units in a group
are being targeted equally. So, if a unit in a group is
not a target, then another unit from the same group cannot
be simultaneously the target of two different units of the
opposing group (in other words, we assume no overkill).
Based on this assumption, the user must determine which
groups of one force are the targets of which groups of the
other. Clearly, if the two opposing forces consist of one
group each, there is nothing to be determined.
We now describe the logical sequencing of the model.
The losses and the values of the remaining staying power and
theoretical combat power are calculated for each group in both
forces at the end of each discrete time step. During one time
step each group is hit by one pulse or not at all (never more
than one pulse). If a particular group is hit, then its
percentage losses are calculated which determines remaining
staying power and new offensive and defensive theoretical
combat power. In the next time step we use these new
calculated values. Then for the particular time step at hand,
we sum over all the groups of each force. Thus at the end of
each time step we find the total remaining values of staying
power and theoretical combat power for each force. We
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terminate the procedure when one of the forces reaches its
break point, or after a specified number of time steps,
whichever comes first. At the end, the user observes the
losses on both sides as well as the remaining staying power
and theoretical combat power of each force. Implicitly the
side which won (or will win) is the side that eliminates the
other's staying power, or forces the other to end the battle
by the break point criterion. Another numerical example will
clarify the process.
5. Example 2: Aggregated Force Case
Consider now a more complicated scenario than
presented in Example 1. The Red force consists of four FFs and
the Blue force of only three FFs. To keep the analysis as
clear as possible, assume that all the FFs have the same
specifications and carry the same type of missiles. The
relevant values for each force are presented in Table V. Since
the same type of missile is assumed for both forces, the
multiplicative factor W, can again be omitted.
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TABLE V. CHARACTERISTICS OF RED AND BLUE SHIPS
Blue FF Red FF
Factor (3 ships) (4 ships)
Full load displacement Db = 4000 Dr = 4000
Staying power for each
ship (computed) S= 1.11 SPr 1.11
Missiles per salvo Mb = 3 Mr = 3
Multipl. degrader for M mb = 0.7 mr = 0.7
Shots down per salvo Nb = 2 Nr = 2
Multipl. degrader for N nb = 0.8 nr = 0.8
Scouting function Ob = 0.8 or = 0.8
Alertness modifier Tb = 0.8 T r = 0.8
Probability of hit H = 0.8
Note that we are assuming the two sides have the same
scouting function and the same multiplicative degraders m and
n. Hence, at time t both forces are firing a salvo. We assume
further that the battle terminates after three pulses from
each side, or when a side reaches 80% loss, whichever comes
first.
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Initial staving Rower for both forces (aggregated):
Red force: SPr = 4 x 1. = 4.44
Blue force: SPb = 3 x 1.11 = 3.33
Note that remaining theoretical combat power P is
expressed for one ship. At the end, if we need the total
remaining theoretical combat power of the whole force we
multiply it by the number of ships in the force.
* At the end of the first discrete time step we have
Blue force
Percentage loss of the total Blue force:
LOSSb = (aOx4xMrxmrxH - Obx 3xNbxnb) / SPb
= (0.8x4x3xO.7x0.8 - 0.8x3x2x0.8)/3.33 = 0.46
(or, a loss of 46% in the Blue force)
Remaining staving Rower:
SPb =SPbx(I-LOSSb) = 3.33 x (1-0.46) = 1.8 (for
entire force)
Updated P and N:
Pb = MbX(I-LOSSb) = 3 x (1-0.46) = 1.62 (for each
ship)
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LOSSr = (Gbx 3 xMbXmbxH - Orx4xNr xnr) / SP,
= (0.8x3x3xO.7x0.8 - O.8x4x2x0.8)/4.44 = -0.24
(the negative value means no loss in the Red force)
Remaining staving Rower and theoretical combat Dower:
SPr = 4.44 (same as before)
Pr= 4 (same as before)
Nr= 2 (same as before)
* At the end of the second time step (assuming that both




LOSSb = (Ozx4 xMrXM rxH - obx 3xNbxnb) / SPb
= (0.8x4x3x0.7x0.8 - 0.8x3xl.08xO.8)/l.8 = 1.8
(or, a loss of 100% in the Blue force)
So, at the end of the second time step the entire Blue
force has suffered a firepower kill while the Red force has
essentially no damage. This should be evident without
calculations. The Red force suffered no damage at all after
the first pulse delivered by an undamaged Blue force. In the
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second pulse the Blue force has now suffered a loss of 45% and
the weaker force will still be unable to damage the Red force.
The value of LOSSb (greater than 1.0) after the second pulse
declares that Blue FF's received more hits (overkill) than
necessary to put them all out of action.
Let's retain the same basic scenario but alter the
human factor values slightly. The new values for both forces
are shown underlined in Table VI.
TABLE VI. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RED AND BLUE SHIPS
Blue FF Red FF
Factor (3 ships) (4 ships)
Full load displacement Db = 4000 Dr = 4000
Staying power for each
ship (computed) SPb = 1.11 SPr = 1.11
Missiles per salvo Mb = 3 Mr = 3
Multipl. degrader for M Mb = 0.7 Mr = 0.6
Shots down per salvo Nb = 2 Nr = 2
MultiDl. degrader for N nh = 0.8 nr = 0.6
Scouting function a = 0.85 2, = 0.75
Alertness modifier =-0.85 = 0.75
Probability of hit H = 0.8
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In summary, the Red force now has less information
about the enemy and less defensive ability (0.75 versus 0.85).
Moreover mr = 0.6 and nr = 0.6 (not well trained, low morale,
and so forth). We assume also that the Red force is able to
return fire before receiving its opponent's pulse. In this
case we again have an exchange of fire.
0 At the end of the first discrete time step we have
Blue force
Percentage loss of the total Blue force:
LOSSb = (Orx4xMrxmrxH - Tbx 3xNbxnb) / SPb
= (0.75x4x3x0.6x0.8 - 0.85x3x2x0.8)/3.33 = 0.07
(or, a loss of 7% of the Blue force)
Remaining staying Dower:
SPb =SPbx(I-LOSSb) = 3.33 x (1-0.07) = 3.1 (for
entire force)
Update P and N:
Pb = Mbx(1-LOSSb) = 3 x (1-0.07) = 2.79 (for each
ship)
Nb = Nbx(l-LOSSb) = 2 x (1-0.07) = 1.86 (for each
ship)
Red force
Percentage loss for the total Red force:
LOSS, = (Obx 3 xMbxmbxH - vrx4xNrxn,) / SPr
= (0.85x3x3x0.7x0.8 - 0.75x4x2x0.6)/4.44 = 0.154
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(or, a loss of 15.4% of the Red force)
Remaining staying Dower:
SPr =SPX(I-LOSS,) = 4.44 x (1-0.154) = 3.75 (for
entire force)
Update P and N:
P, = M:x(l-LOSS) = 3 x (1-0.154) = 2.54 (for each
ship)
Nr = Nx(1-LOSS.) = 2 x (1-0.154) = 1.69 (for each
ship)
* At the end of the second discrete time step we have
Blue force
Percentage loss:
LOSSb = (orx4xMxmrxH - Cbx 3 xNbxnb) / SPb
(0.75x4x2.54x0.6x0.8 - 0.85x3xl.86x0.8)/3.1 = -0.04
(or, no loss at all in the Blue force)
Remaining stavina Dower:
SPb = 3.1 (same as before)
Update P and N:
Pb = 2.79 (same as before)
Nb = 1.86 (same as before)
Red force
Percentaae loss:
LOSS, = (Obx3xMbxmbxH - cx4xNrxn,) / SP,
= (0.85x3x2.79x0.7x0.8 - 0.75x4xl.69x0.6)/3.75 = 0.25
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(or, a loss of 25% of the remaining strength in the Red
force)
Remaining staving Dower:
SPr =SPrx(1-LOSSr) = 3.75 x (1-0.25) = 2.8 (for entire
force)
Uodate P and N:
Pr = Mrx(l-LOSSr) = 2.54 x (1-0.25) = 1.9 (for each
ship)
Nr = Nx(l-LOSSr) = 1.69 x (1-0.25) = 1.27 (for each
ship)
* At the end of the third discrete time step we have
Blue force
No losses, same values of SPb, Pb, and Nb as before
Red force
Percentage loss:
LOSSr = (ObX 3 XMbxmbxH - rx 4 xNrxnr) / SPr =
(0.85x3x2.79x0.7x0.8 - 0.75x4x1.27x0.6)/2.8 = 0.6
(or, a loss of 60% of the remaining strength in the Red
force)
Remainina staving Dower:
SPr =SPx(l-LOSS) = 2.8 x (1-0.6) = 1.12 (for the
entire force)
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Update P and N:
P, = Mrx(1-LOSS) = 1.9 x (1-0.6) = 0.76 (for each
ship)
Nr = Nx(l-LOSS) = 1.27 x (1-0.6) = 0.51 (for each
ship)
Starting total theoretical combat power = 4 x 4 = 12
Remaining total theoretical combat power = 4 x 0.76 = 3.04
As you can see, after the third pulse the Blue force
has a total loss of only 7% while the Red force has a loss of
about 75% (only one fourth remains of its initial values of
staying power and theoretical combat power). Now the
importance of human factors is entirely evident: without
consideration of human factors the Red force wins: but,
according to our model, after incorporating human factors, the
Blue force wins.
6. Computer Model
The model was implemented with a computer program for
the given assumptions (see Appendix A). The program was tested
for all the cases presented in Examples 1 and 2 and verified
to work correctly. The outputs with the same results as are
hand-calculated in the examples above are also given in
Appendix A.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, the model developed in Chapter IV deals with
naval surface missile battles. It exploits the fact that these
battles have a particular characteristic: namely, that
attrition in both forces is instantaneous and is incurred
through the application of pulses or "salvos" from the
opponents' forces. So the values of staying power and combat
power, as well as the loss in each force, can be calculated at
the end of every discrete time step or salvo. Based on salvo
results at each step, at the end of the last time step one can
assess the outcome of the particular battle.
We believe the model is a promising and appealing one.
First, it seems to have an advantage over the QJM approach
because it accounts for the dynamics of a battle. Second, it
implements Beall's model and extends it in the following ways:
* It deals with missiles, the most effective weapon of
today's naval battles.
* It takes into account the defensive ability of both
forces.
* It integrates the scouting effectiveness and the alertness
in defense for both opponents.
* It incorporates several important human factors that
affect the outcome of a battle.
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A possible weakness of the model is the provisional way
human factors are quantified. How is it possible to assign
values to these so called intangible variables? Our answer to
that question is twofold. First, we did not try to assign
particular values to the abstract human factors: willpower,
morale, leadership, etc. Instead we tried to show the effect
these human factors have upon the offensive and defensive
capabilities of both opponents. Second, although everybody
admits the great importance of human factors in a battle,
usually no one is willing to indicate in what way they exert
this influence. We have made a step into that difficult area
and have given some analytical structure that will serve as a
guide in the gathering of data in a most useful form to help
future researchers.
What is needed next in order for this model to become a
more useful tool? Our recommendations for future research are
the following:
* Perform an extensive sensitivity analysis on the model. In
other words, by changing slightly the different
parameters, how does the model respond? Thus, it will be
possible to check the reasonableness of the parameters and
the assigned ranges to them.
" Analyze the small number of existing historical missile
naval battles using the model. By doing this, the validity
of the model can be assessed and (based on the existing
historical data) a better sense of appropriate values for
some of the model parameters (such as o,r,m, and n) can be
obtained.
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* Expand the program described in Appendix A to cover all





The following program codes the naval combat model
described in Chapter IV. The code is Fortran 77 and it was




* 1. Same type of missiles for both forces (the average missile)
* 2. Each force is consisting of one group
* 3. In the duration of each discrete time step we assume that both
* forces receive one pulse, either both forces fire simultaneously
* or the one force returns fire, after it has already received its









PRINT *, 'PLEASE, ENTER THE FOLLOWING DATA FOR BOTH OPPONENTS'
PRINT *, 'BE CAREFUL, THE FIRST VALUE YOU ENTER TO BE FOR THE'
PRINT *, 'BLUE FORCE AND THE SECOND FOR THE RED'
PRINT *, 'NUMBER OF UNITS IN EACH FORCE (INTEGER)'
READ *, BUNITS,RUNITS
PRINT *, 'FULL LOAD DISPLACEMENT FOR BOTH FORCES (INTEGER)'
READ *, DB,DR
PRINT *, 'SCOUTING FUNCTION FOR BOTH FORCES (REAL)'
'READ *, SFB,SFR
PRINT *, 'ALERTNESS FUNCTION FOR BOTH FORCES (REAL)'
READ *, AFB,AFR
PRINT *, 'NUMBER OF MISSILES A UNIT CAN FIRE PER SALVO FOR BOTH'
PRINT *, 'FORCES (REAL)'
READ *, MB,MR
PRINT *, 'MULTIPLICATIVE DEGRADER FOR M FOR BOTH FORCES (REAL)'
READ *, MDB,MDR
PRINT *, 'NUMBER OF MISSILES A UNIT CAN SHOT DOWN IN ONE SALVO'
PRINT *, 'FOR BOTH FORCES (INTEGER)'
READ *, NB,NR
PRINT *, 'MULTIPLICATIVE DEGRADER FOR N, FOR BOTH FORCES (REAL)'
READ *, NDB,NDR
PRINT *, 'THE BREAK POINT FOR BOTH FORCES (REAL BETWEEN 0 AND 1)'
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PRINT *, 'NOTE: THIS IS THE PERCENTAGE OF THE INITIAL STAYING'
PRINT *, 'POWER BELOW WHICH THE BATTLE IS CONSIDERED TERMINATED'
PRINT *, 'IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO ASSIGN VALUES FOR BREAK POINT'
PRINT *, 'ENTER 0.0,0.0'
READ *, BRPNTB, BRPNTR
PRINT *, 'PROBABILITY OF HIT VERSUS UNDEFENDED TARGET (REAL)'
READ *, H
















PRINT *, 'ARE BOTH FORCES FIRING SIMULTANEOUSLY THE PULSES?'
PRINT *, '(1 IF YES, 0 IF NO)'
88
READ* W
IF (W .EQ. 0) GO TO 15
PRINT *1 1
*PROGRAM EXECUTION
* Both forces fire simultaneously
10 1 =I+ 1
LOSSB= (SFR*REAL (RUNITS) *REAL (KR) *MDR*H-AFB*REAL (BUNITS) *UPDNB*
" NDB)/REMSPB
IF (LOSSE .LT. 0.0) LOSSE = 0.0





LOSSR= (SFB*REAL(BUNITS) *REAL (MB) *MDB*H-AFR*REAL (RUNITS) *UPDNR*
" NDR)/REMSPR
IF (LOSSR .LT. 0.0) LOSSR = 0.0






IF (((1-TLOSSB) -LE. BRPNTB) .AND.
+((1-TLOSSR) .LE. BRPNTR)) GO TO 991
IF ((1-TLOSSB) .LE. BRPNTB) GO TO 992
IF ((1-TLOSSR) .LE. BRPNTR) GO TO 993
MR = REMPR
MB = REMPB
IF (I .LT. NPULSE) GO TO 10
15 CONTINUE
IF (W .EQ. 0) THEN
PRINT *,'WHICH FORCE FIRES FIRST? NOTE: THAT MEANS THAT THEO
PRINT *~'OTHER FORCE RECEIVES THE PULSE FIRST AND THEN'
PRINT *,'RETURNS THE FIRE (0 FOR RED FORCE 1 FOR BLUE FORCE)'
READ *,Z
IF (Z .EQ. 1) GO TO 30
*Red force fires first
20 1= I+ 1
WOSSB= (SFR*REAL(RUNITS) *REMPR*MDR*H-AFB*REAL(BUNITS) *
+ UPDNB*NDB) /REMSPB
IF (LOSSB .LT. 0.0) LOSSB =0.0
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IF ((l-TLoOSSB) .LE. BRPNTB) GO TO 992
LOSSR= (SFB*REAL(BUNITS) *REMPB*MDB*H-AFR*REAL(RUNlITS) *
+ UPDNR*NDR)/REMSPR
IF (LOSSR .LT. 0.0) LOSSR = 0.0





IF ((1-TLOSSR) .LE. BRPNTR*TOTSPR) GO TO 993
IF (I .LT. NPULSE) GO TO 20
30 CONTINUE
IF (Z .EQ. 1) THEN
40 1 =I+ 1
* Blue force fires first
LOSSR-(SFB*REAL(BUNITS) *REMPB*MDB*H-AFR*
+ REAL(RUNITS) *UPDNR*NDR)/REMSPR
IF (LOSSR .LT. 0.0) LOSSR - 0.0





IF ((1-TLOSSR) .LE. BRPNTR*TOTSPR) GO TO 993
LOSSB= (SFR*REAL(RUNITS)*RMR*D*HAB
+ REAL(BUNITS) *UPDNB*NDB)/flEHSPB
IF (LOSSB .LT. 0.0) LOSSB = 0.0





IF ((l-TLOSSB) .LE. BRPNTB*TOTSPB) GO TO 992
IF (I .LT. NPULSE) GO TO 40
ENDIF
ENDI F
CALL EXCMS('FILEDEF 10 DISK NAVCOM OUTPUT At)
WRITE(10,94) 'AFTER',I,l PULSES THE RED FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS',
+ TLOSSR,'WITH REMAININGI
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WRITE(1O,95) 'STAYING POWER' ,REMSPR,
+ 'AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER ',REMPR
WRITE(1O,94) 'AFTER',I,'PULSES THE BLUE FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS',
+ TLOSSB, 'WITH REMAINING'
WRITE(10,95) 'STAYING POWER' ,REMSPB,
+ 'AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER ',REMPB





991 CALL EXCMS('FILEDEF 10 DISK NAVCOM OUTPUT A')
WRITE(10,996) 'BOTH FORCES REACHED THEIR BREAK POINT'
WRITE(10,994) 'AFTER',I,'PULSES THE RED FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS*,
+ TLOSSR, 'WITH REMAINING'
WRITE(1O,995) 'STAYING POWER' ,REMSPR,
+ 'AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER ',REMPR
WRITE(10,994) 'AFTER',I,'PULSES THE BLUE FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS',
+ TLOSSB,IWITH REMAINING'
WRITE(10,995) 'STAYING POWER' ,REMSPB,
+ 'AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER ',REMPB






992 CALL EXCMS('FILEDEF 10 DISK NAVCOM OUTPUT A')
WRITE(10,999)'BLUE FORCE REACHED ITS BREAK POINT. RED FORCE WINS'
WRITE(10,997) 'AFTER',I,' PULSES THE RED FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS',
+ TLOSSR,'WITH REMAINING'
WRITE(10,998) 'STAYING POWER',REMSPR,
+ 'AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER ',REMPR
WRITE(10,997) 'AFTERI,I,'PULSES THE BLUE FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS',
+ TLOSSB,'WITH REMAINING'
WRITE(10,998) 'STAYING POWER',REMSPB,
+ 'AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER ',REMPB





993 CALL EXCMS('FILEDEF 10 DISK NAVCOM OUTPUT A')
WRITE(10,899)'RED FORCE REACHED ITS BREAK POINT. BLUE FORCE WINS'
WRITE(10,897) 'AFTER',I,' PULSES THE RED FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS',
+ TLOSSR,'WITH REMAINING'
WRITE(10,898) 'STAYING POWER',REMSPR,
+ 'AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER ',REMPR
WRITE(10,897) 'AFTER',I,' PULSES THE BLUE FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS',
+ TLOSSB, 'WITH REMAINING'
WRITE(10,898) 'STAYING POWER',REMSPB,
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+ 'AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER ',REMPB








We give below all the outputs generated by the above
program for the examples presented in the main body of the
thesis (Chapter IV).
Example 1 - Case A
AFTER 1 PULSES THE RED FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS 0.40 WITH REMAINING
STAYING POWER 0.67 AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER 2.40
AFTER 1 PULSES THE BLUE FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS 0.92 WITH REMAINING
STAYING POWER 0.09 AND REMAINING THECRETICAL COMBAT POWER 0.25
THE PROGRAM IS TERMINATED HERE
Example 1 - Case B
AFTER 1 PULSES THE RED FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS 0.79 WITH REMAINING
STAYING POWER 0.24 AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER 0.85
AFTER 1 PULSES THE BLUE FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS 0.00 WITH REMAINING
STAYING POWER 1.12 AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER 3.00
THE PROGRAM IS TERMINATED HERE
Example 2 - Case A
BLUE FORCE REACHED ITS BREAK POINT. RED FORCE WINS
AFTER 2 PULSES THE RED FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS 0.00 WITH REMAINING
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STAYING POWER 4.47 AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER 3.00
AFTER 2 PULSES THE BLUE FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS 1.00 WITH REMAINING
STAYING POWER 0.00 AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER 0.00
THE PROGRAM IS TERMINATED HERE
Example 2 - Case B
AFTER 3 PULSES THE RED FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS 0.74 WITH REMAINING
STAYING POWER 1.18 AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER 0.79
AFTER 3 PULSES THE BLUE FORCE HAS TOTAL LOSS 0.07 WITH REMAINING
STAYING POWER 3.11 AND REMAINING THEORETICAL COMBAT POWER 2.79
THE PROGRAM IS TERMINATED HERE
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